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ABSTRACT 
Since February 2001, the Hypervelocity Impact 
Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center 
(JSC) in Houston has performed 35 post-flight 
inspections on space exposed hardware returned from 
the International Space Station (ISS). Data on 1,188 
observations of micrometeoroid and orbital debris 
(MMOD) damage have been collected from these 
inspections.  Survey documentation typically includes 
impact feature location and size measurements as well 
as microscopic photography (25-200x). Sampling of 
impacts sites for projectile residue was performed for 
the largest features. Results of energy dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopic analysis to discern impactor source are 
included in the database when available.  This paper will 
focus on two inspections, the Pressurized Mating 
Adapter 2 (PMA-2) cover returned in 2015 after 1.6 
years exposure with 26 observed impact features, and 
two Airlock shield panels returned in 2010 after 8.75 
years exposure with 58 MMOD impacts.  Feature sizes 
from the observed data are compared to predictions 
using the Bumper 3 risk assessment code. 
1 PMA-2 COVER 
Two of the three Pressurized Mating Adapters (PMAs) 
on the International Space Station (ISS) are utilized for 
visiting vehicles. In recent years both PMA-2 and PMA-
3 had temporary covers installed over the docking port 
to provide thermal control and MMOD protection. The 
covers were constructed with Beta cloth outer layers and 
internal layers of Kevlar. The PMA-2 cover (Fig. 1) was 
installed on the forward facing docking port during US 
extravehicular activity (EVA) #22 on July 9, 2013 and 
removed during US EVA #30 on February 25, 2015 [1]. 
The cover was returned May 21, 2015 on the SpaceX 
CRS-6 mission and a post flight MMOD inspection was 
performed by NASA, Jacobs and Boeing personnel at 
the JSC HVIT facility on March 16, 2016. 
 
Figure 1. Location of PMA-2 cover 
2 PMA-2 INSPECTION RESULTS 
Fig. 2 shows the inspection of the PMA-2 cover at JSC. 
The circular blanket was approximately 2 meters in 
diameter with a 0.20 mm thick beta cloth (silica fiber) 
outer cover. Also inspected were nine beta cloth straps 
that were used to hold the cover in place on the PMA. 
The inspection was performed in three steps. An initial 
screening was performed on all space exposed surfaces 
with 15X handheld magnifiers, with 34 areas of interest 
marked for further study. In the second step each area of 
interest was examined with a handheld 25X-200X 
microscope enabling a more detailed characterization. 
26 sites were observed with distinct hypervelocity 
impact features and 8 sites were judged to be non-
MMOD. Fig. 3 shows feature #1 from Tab.1 as typical 
MMOD impact damage observed during the inspection. 
The final inspection step involved a boom mounted 
digital microscope that allowed precise measurements 
of the entry hole. 
 
Figure 2. PMA-2 cover inspection 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170003824 2019-08-29T22:52:12+00:00Z
Damage sizes on the beta cloth outer surface of the 
cover and the hold-down straps ranged from just over 
1mm to 0.13mm in diameter. 
  
Figure 3. Typical impact damage on PMA-2 cover 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of PMA-2 entry hole sizes  
An equivalent circular hole size was determined from 
the maximum (D1) diameter and the hole dimension in 
the orthogonal direction to the maximum direction (D2). 
 
 
𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = (𝐷𝐷1 ∗ 𝐷𝐷2)0.5 (1) 
Eq. 1 results in a circular area with the same area as the 
measured hole assuming elliptical geometry for the 
hole. Calculated entry hole diameters are provided in 
Tab. 1. It can be seen in the distribution of entry hole 
diameters (Fig. 4) that feature sizes in the 0.3 to 0.6 mm 
range were the most common. The mean value of the 26 
observations was 0.45 mm.  
Table 1. Damage sizes on PMA-2 cover 
Feature 
# 
D1  
(mm) 
D2 
(mm) 
Dhole 
(mm) 
dp 
(mm) 
1 0.62 0.59 0.60 0.26 
2 1.19 0.85 1.01 0.44 
3 0.50 0.44 0.47 0.20 
4 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.26 
5 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.14 
6 0.41 0.29 0.34 0.15 
7 0.55 0.47 0.51 0.22 
8 0.60 0.53 0.56 0.25 
9 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.16 
10 0.93 0.69 0.80 0.35 
11 0.44 0.38 0.41 0.18 
12 0.73 0.44 0.57 0.25 
13 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.32 
14 0.40 0.25 0.32 0.14 
15 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.17 
16 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.14 
17 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.14 
18 0.49 0.35 0.41 0.18 
19 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.11 
20 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.19 
21 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.07 
22 0.31 0.21 0.26 0.11 
23 0.61 0.57 0.59 0.26 
24 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.16 
25 0.58 0.46 0.52 0.22 
26 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.06 
Mean 0.50 0.41 0.45 0.20 
Max 1.19 0.85 1.01 0.44 
Min 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.06 
3 ANALYSIS of PMA-2 DAMAGE SITES 
3.1 Sampling 
Six intact impact features (#1, 2, 10, 12, 13 and 24) were 
extracted with a hammer and punch. The samples were 
stored in cases that preserved the orientation of the 
individual blanket layers. 
3.2 SEM/EDS Results 
SEM/EDS analysis results are summarized in Tab. 2. 
Four of the six samples yielded results that indicate high 
density orbital debris as the source. 
Table 2. PMA-2 Cover SEM/EDS Results 
# Hole  
Diameter 
(mm) 
Impactor Type/ 
Major Constituent 
Possible 
Impactor 
1 0.60 OD: Steel, ZnS, FeO, Ti Steel 
2 1.01 OD: Steel, Nickel-Oxide Steel 
10 0.80 OD: Steel, Iron-oxide Steel 
12 0.57 MM: Ca, Mg, Fe, S, O Chondrite 
13 0.73 MM: Fe, Ni, S  metal/ 
sulfide-
rich MM 
24 0.36 OD: Steel, Iron-oxide, Ti Steel 
 
An example of the scanning electron microscopy used 
to determine the nature of the impactors on the PMA-2 
cover is provided for impact #13, observed on one of the 
tie down straps. The impact area is backlit in Fig. 5, 
highlighting the extent of the subsurface damage. The 
impact event melted both the projectile and the beta 
cloth target (Figs. 6-7). Analysis by scanning electron 
microscope indicated this damage was due to a 
micrometeoroid impactor rich in iron, nickel and sulfur. 
 
Figure 5. Impact in PMA-2 cover tie down strap 
 
Figure 6. Impactor melt flow around beta cloth fibers 
 
Figure 7. Close-up image of impactor melt droplets  
4 PREDICTIONS OF PMA-2 COVER 
DAMAGE WITH BUMPER 3 
4.1 Particle Size Estimate 
A damage equation for beta-cloth was developed based 
on hypervelocity impact data for small particles (<0.4 
mm diameter) [2]. Eq. 2 relates the clear-hole diameter 
(Dhole) in the beta cloth to the projectile diameter (dp). 
 
 
𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 2.3𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 (2) 
No correlation with projectile velocity, angle or density 
was attempted due to lack of data. Estimated particle 
diameter for each observed feature is shown in the “dp” 
column of Tab. 1.  
4.2 Bumper 3 Inputs 
The analysis procedure in Bumper 3 involved 
calculating the expected number of MM and OD 
impacts from selected particle diameters in Tab. 1. The 
standalone finite element representation of the PMA-2 
cover used as the input geometry in Bumper 3 is shown 
in the right hand side of Fig. 8.   
 
Figure 8. PMA-2 cover surface geometry and FE 
model 
For each year of the assessment (2013 through 2015) the 
Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) at JSC 
produced ORDEM 3.0 data files for the assessment [3] 
using time-averaged altitude data provided by HVIT, 
shown in Tab. 3. The MEM-R2 environment model [4], 
was used to produce the “MEMR2_LEO_ISS.out” data 
file at 400 kilometer altitude and 51.6° inclination. 
Table 3. PMA-2 cover exposure time and altitude 
Start 
Date 
End  
Date 
Days Years Altitude 
(km) 
7/9/13 1/1/14 176 0.482 413.6 
1/1/14 1/1/15 365 1.000 414.5 
1/1/15 2/25/15 55 0.151 402.1 
Total 596 1.633  
4.3 Bumper 3 Results 
Predictions from Bumper 3 for the number of MEM-R2 
and ORDEM 3.0 impacts are provided in Tab. 4 for six 
representative particle diameters. Using Eq. 2, 
equivalent hole diameters are also given. The lower 
bound on the predictions was set at 0.0125 cm due to the 
fact that diameters below that are not available in the 
release version of MEM-R2. The expected number of 
ORDEM 3.0 impacts for each particle diameter were 
assessed for years 2013, 2014 and 2015 with the results 
for 2013 and 2015 scaled by the durations shown in Tab. 
3. One year MEM-R2 impact predictions for the six 
diameters were scaled by the 1.633 year total exposure 
time.  Using the Regression data analysis tool in Excel, 
coefficients for continuous curves of expected values 
were derived from the Bumper 3 predictions. 
Table 4. Bumper 3 predictions for PMA-2 damage 
Hole 
Diam 
(cm) 
Particle 
Diam 
(cm) 
MEM 
R2 
ORDEM 
3.0 
MEMR2 
+ 
ORDEM3 
0.0288 0.0125 16.89 14.60 31.49 
0.0460 0.020 4.40 3.87 8.27 
0.0920 0.040 0.46 0.68 1.14 
0.1380 0.060 0.11 0.30 0.40 
0.1840 0.080 0.04 0.15 0.19 
0.2300 0.100 0.02 0.08 0.10 
 
Fig. 9 compares the observed entry hole diameters on 
the PMA-2 cover with Bumper 3 predictions for the 
expected number of impacts from ORDEM 3.0 and 
MEMR2. Observations below 0.03 cm show typical 
roll-off at the small end of MMOD inspection data sets, 
due to the difficulty in finding small impact features 
(i.e., sensor/observation limitations). 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of 26 estimated particle sizes 
causing observed damage on the PMA-2 cover and 
Bumper 3 predictions 
5 AIRLOCK SHIELD PANELS 
The Quest airlock was launched on the Space Shuttle 
Atlantis STS-104 mission and installed on the starboard 
side of Node 1 during ISS assembly flight 7A in July 
2001. At the same time two oxygen and two nitrogen 
High-Pressure Gas Tanks (HPGT) were installed on the 
airlock. In November 2009, the STS-129 Shuttle 
mission delivered a fifth HPGT as part of the ULF-3 
assembly flight. To make way for the new HPGT 
installation, two airlock shield panels were removed, 
covered with an insulation blanket and stored on an 
external logistics pallet until they were returned on the 
19A assembly flight on April 2010 after nearly 8.75 
years of exposure time. The post flight MMOD 
inspection was performed by NASA and Jacobs 
personnel on January 7, 2011 in JSC Building 13. Fig. 
10 shows the zenith side of the airlock with the removed 
shield panels highlighted. 
6 AIRLOCK INSPECTION RESULTS 
The airlock shield panels are made of aluminum 6061-
T6 and are each 1.3 m long, 0.84 m wide and 0.2 cm 
thick. The survey of these panels was limited to a visual 
inspection with additional characterization by handheld 
digital microscope. Craters less than 0.25 mm diameter 
were not recorded.  The inspection measured the “inside 
diameter” of the crater, recorded at the original height 
of the panel surface. A total of 58 craters were observed, 
34 on the outboard panel and 24 on the inboard. The 
inspected shield panels can be seen in Fig. 11 with the 
58 regions of interest flagged (colored arrows). 56 of the 
58 observed craters were nearly circular, with only two 
elliptical craters recorded. The largest circular impact 
crater (Fig. 12) measured 1.8 mm in diameter.  
 
Figure 10. Location of removed airlock shields 
 
Figure 11. Inspection results on airlock shields 
 
Figure 12. 1.8 mm impact crater on airlock panel 
This impact produced a 2 mm diameter bulge on the 
backside of the 2.03 mm shield panel. An elliptical 
crater measuring 2.4 x 0.9 mm (Fig. 13) was observed 
on the same panel. 
 
Figure 13. 2.4 x 0.9 mm impact crater on airlock panel 
An equivalent circular crater size was calculated from 
measured dimensions using Eq. 1 and the crater 
diameter distribution is given in Fig. 14.  
 
Figure 14. Distribution of airlock crater diameters 
7 ANALYSIS OF AIRLOCK DAMAGE 
SITES 
7.1 Sampling 
Since intact extraction of entire craters was not 
permitted by the hardware owners, samples were 
collected at nine damage sites. In Figs. 12 and 13 the 
raised crater lips typically present in aluminium target 
can be seen. The sampling technique for the airlock 
shield involved removing portions of the crater lip 
material and retrieving small fragments scraped from 
the crater bottom. Red dots in Figs. 15 and 16 indicate 
the locations of the sampled craters. 
 
Figure 15. 24 craters on airlock shield 01-04B, 
sampled craters highlighted with red circles 
 
Figure 16. 34 craters on airlock shield 02-04B, 
sampled craters highlighted with red circles 
7.2 SEM/EDS Results 
SEM/EDS analysis results are summarized in Tab. 5. 
Eight of the nine samples yielded results that indicate 
orbital debris as the source.  
Table 5. Airlock SEM/EDS Results 
Sample Crater 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Impactor 
Type/Major 
Constituent 
Possible 
Impactor 
33-1 1.78 OD: SiO Silica 
33-2 1.06 OD: CF, Si, 
SiO 
PTFE, 
Silica 
33-8 1.48 OD: Fe, SIO, 
Pb, Cr, Ni, 
Co 
Silica, 
paint, 
metal 
alloys 
33-21 0.73 unknown -- 
34-2 1.17 OD: CF, Fe PTFE 
34-8 0.42 OD: CF, K, 
Ca, Ti, SiO 
PTFE, 
Silica 
34-10 0.81 OD: SiO, Fe, 
Cu, Zn 
Silica 
34-12 0.45 OD: SiO, 
BaS, Cu, Zn 
Silica, 
paint 
34-14 0.85 OD: CF PTFE  
 
Crater 33-1 is shown in Fig. 17. An extracted sample 
from the crater with the associated SEM image and 
spectra are given in Fig. 18. This sample along with 
many others appeared to have silica melted into the 
aluminium. 
 
Figure 17. 1.8mm diameter crater in airlock (33-1) 
 
Figure 18. SEM results of sample from crater 33-1 
indicate trace silica melt in the aluminum 
8 AIRLOCK DAMAGE PREDICTIONS 
8.1 Feature Size Estimate 
Tab. 5 provides a listing of the crater diameters 
observed on the airlock shield panel. Effective crater 
diameter (Dc) was calculated using Eq. 1. Assuming that 
crater depth is ½ crater diameter, Bumper 3 was used to 
estimate the expected number of five representative 
crater depth cases using the Cour-Palais single wall 
equation [5] on a 6061-T6 aluminium wall.  
Table 6. Airlock shield crater diameters. Sampled 
impact sites are highlighted   
Impact 
# 
D1 
(mm) 
D2 
(mm) 
Dc 
(mm) 
34-1 0.5 0.6 0.57 
34-2 1.3 1.1 1.17 
34-3 0.4 0.5 0.45 
34-4 0.5 0.5 0.54 
34-5 0.5 0.5 0.54 
34-6 0.6 0.6 0.58 
34-7 0.5 0.5 0.47 
34-8 0.4 0.4 0.42 
34-9 0.5 0.5 0.51 
34-10 0.8 0.8 0.81 
34-11 0.9 0.9 0.91 
34-12 0.4 0.4 0.45 
34-13 0.6 0.6 0.60 
34-14 0.9 0.8 0.85 
34-15 1.0 1.0 0.97 
34-16 0.4 0.4 0.36 
34-17 0.4 0.4 0.44 
34-18 0.4 0.4 0.39 
34-19 0.4 0.4 0.36 
34-20 0.6 0.6 0.57 
34-21 0.5 0.5 0.50 
34-22 0.4 0.4 0.38 
34-23 0.6 0.5 0.57 
34-24 0.4 0.4 0.39 
34-25 0.4 0.4 0.41 
34-26 0.4 0.4 0.38 
34-27 0.5 0.4 0.45 
34-28 1.0 0.9 0.95 
34-29 0.5 0.4 0.43 
34-30 0.4 0.4 0.38 
34-31 0.4 0.4 0.36 
34-32 0.4 0.4 0.36 
34-33 0.4 0.4 0.43 
34-34 0.4 0.4 0.38 
33-1 1.8 1.8 1.78 
33-2 1.0 1.1 1.06 
33-3 0.6 0.5 0.57 
33-4 0.8 0.7 0.72 
33-5 0.6 0.6 0.61 
33-6 0.4 0.4 0.43 
33-7 0.4 0.4 0.38 
33-8 0.9 2.4 1.48 
33-9 0.6 0.6 0.58 
33-11 0.5 0.5 0.48 
33-12 0.7 0.6 0.66 
33-13 0.5 0.4 0.45 
33-14 0.5 0.5 0.47 
33-15 0.9 0.8 0.84 
33-16 0.4 0.4 0.36 
33-17 0.4 0.4 0.37 
33-18 0.4 0.4 0.38 
33-19 0.4 0.4 0.37 
33-20 0.5 0.5 0.51 
33-21 0.4 1.4 0.73 
33-22 0.3 0.3 0.33 
33-23 0.3 0.3 0.32 
33-24 0.3 0.3 0.31 
33-25 0.4 0.5 0.42 
Mean   0.568 
Max   1.781 
Min   0.311 
  
8.2 Bumper 3 Inputs 
The analysis was performed against a 1.98 m2 finite 
element mesh area on the equipment lock region of the 
airlock. The region is highlighted in Fig. 19.  
 
Figure 19. Airlock shield FEM 
For each year of the assessment (2001 through 2010) 
ORDEM 3.0 data files using time-averaged altitude data 
were provided by the JSC Orbital Debris Program 
Office (Tab. 7). The “MEMR2_LEO_ISS.out” data file 
distributed with Bumper 3 was used in the calculations.  
Table 7. Altitude, exposure time and relevant events  
Year Altitude 
(km) 
Time  
(year) 
Event 
2001 382.68 0.466 07/14/01: Airlock install  
2002 390.04 1.0  
2003 384.61 1.0  
2004 361.66 1.0  
2005 352.54 1.0  
2006 342.20 1.0  
2007 337.55 1.0 10/27/07: P6 moved 
from Z1 to P5 
2008 345.41 1.0  
2009 348.55 1.0 11/23/09: airlock shields 
to ESP-2 
2010 349.40 0.282 04/13/10: shields 
retrieved from ESP-2 
Total 8.753  
8.3 Bumper 3 Results 
Predictions from Bumper 3 for the number of craters 
from MEM-R2 and ORDEM 3.0 are provided in Tab.8 
for five representative depth values. Individual ORDEM 
3.0 assessments were performed for each year from 
2001 through 2010 with the results for 2001 and 2010 
scaled by the durations shown in Tab. 7. MEM-R2 
results with a one year exposure were scaled by the total 
exposure time of 8.753 years.  
Table 8. Bumper 3 predictions for Airlock crater 
depths  
Crater 
Depth 
(cm) 
Crater 
Diameter 
(cm) 
MEM 
R2 
ORDEM 
3.0 
MMOD 
TOTAL 
0.02 0.04 26.955 0.026 26.980 
0.04 0.08 4.726 0.006 4.732 
0.06 0.12 1.467 0.003 1.470 
0.08 0.16 0.605 0.002 0.607 
0.10 0.20 0.297 0.001 0.298 
 
All 58 observed craters are compared with ORDEM 3 
and MEMR2 in Fig. 20. Bumper 3 predicts nearly all 
(≥99.7%) of the craters are from micrometeoroids. The 
predicted number of MMOD impacts was higher than 
observed. The explanation for this is that there were 
more orbital debris impacts observed and very little 
orbital debris was predicted to hit these panels because 
their location on ISS should have prevented orbital 
debris from impacting them.  We believe the likely 
explanation for this discrepancy is that the orbital debris 
found on the airlock panels was due to secondary debris 
(ejecta or penetration products) produced by MMOD 
impacts on the ISS radiators and solar arrays. The 
composition of the OD particles determined by SEM 
analysis supports this hypothesis, with many of the 
craters containing silica (potentially from solar arrays) 
and paint (possibly from radiators). 
8 of the 9 samples that were analyzed produced 
indications of orbital debris. The 8 observed craters 
attributed to orbital debris are compared to ORDEM 3 
predictions in Fig. 21. The predicted number of craters 
from orbital debris is very small compared to 
micrometeoroids due to the orientation of the shield 
panels on the zenith/aft facing region of the airlock.  
 
Figure 20. Observed craters from ORDEM 3 and 
MEMR2 compared to Bumper 3 predictions 
 
Figure 21. Observed craters from ORDEM 3 
compared to Bumper 3 predictions 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
The damage found in post-flight inspection of the PMA 
cover and the returned airlock bumper panels was 
generally consistent with Bumper code predictions 
using the ORDEM 3.0 debris model and MEM-R2 
meteoroid model. An excess of orbital debris damage 
was observed on the airlock bumper panels compared to 
predictions, although this discrepancy is likely the result 
of secondary debris impacts. Fig. 22 shows the ISS 
configuration for a majority of the time the airlock 
panels were exposed to MMOD. The airlock bumper 
panels lie in close proximity to the solar array wings on 
the P6 truss. The silica rich impact sites on the airlock 
panels could be a product of secondaries from the solar 
array panels, either front side ejecta from the initial 
impact or back side penetration products. Painted 
radiator surfaces are also near the airlock shield panels, 
and secondaries from these surfaces could account for 
the paint detected by SEM in some of the airlock craters. 
 
Figure 22. Airlock on ISS after 7A mission  
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